Image kindly provided by Matteo Cerofolini

Gilberto Cerofolini was from Rimini (Forlì).

The 13^o Gruppo (77^a, 78^a and 82^a Squadriglie) was commanded by Maggiore Secondo Revetria and started the war based at Tripoli Castelbenito airfield with twenty-five CR.42s and eleven CR.32s on hand (the CR.32s, kept as a reserve, were later passed on to the 50^o Stormo Assalto) to guard against a possible French attach from the west.
Pilots in the 82^a Squadriglia were: Capitano Guglielmo Arrabito (CO), Tenente Guglielmo Chiarini (arrived from 53^o Stormo on 9 June), Sottotenente Giuseppe Bottà, Sottotenente Virgilio Vanzan, Sottotenente Giuseppe Timolina, Sottotenente Cerofolini, Sergente Maggiore Dante Davico, Sergente Renato Giansante, Sergente Franco Porta, Sergente Francesco Nanin, Sergente Filippo Baldin, Sergente Riccardo Bonoli and Sergente Albino Falasco (arrived on 9 June).
Total strength of the Squadriglia was twelve CR.42s (three of them still under assembly), six CR.32quaters and one Breda Ba.25 for liaison. The CR.32s were used in patrol missions until 13 June.

On 26 June, four CR.42s from the 82^a Squadriglia and one from the 78^a Squadriglia took off at 08:45 to make a standing patrol over the 2nd Libyan Infantry division. The formation flew as far as Sollum but at 09:45 during the return flight, Sottotenente Italo Santavacca (78^a Squadriglia) was forced to make an emergency landing at Sidi Azeiz due to the compete loss of engine oil. Tenente Guglielmo Chiarini landed near him but when returning to T2, he was obliged to force-land at Gambut for the same reason at 10:05. At 10:20, Sergente Filippo Baldin also had to perform the same for the same reason. Capitano Guglielmo Arrabito landed at Gambut to see what had happened to his pilots but when he took taking off again he had to force-land at Sidi Bu Amud before reaching Tobruk for the usual lack of oil at 10:40. There he found Sottotenente Cerofolini, who had already force-landed at 10:35. The formation completely failed to return! Adding insult to injury, the advancing enemy burned Santavacca s CR.42 at Sidi Azeiz and the pilot was probably taken prisoner during the same raid.

On 18 September, Sottotenente Cerofolini and Maresciallo Gastone Calzolai of the 82^a Squadriglia escorted the Caproni Ca.309 of Generale Francesco Pricolo, CO-in-Chief of the Regia Aeronautica to Menastir M when he was visiting the African front.

At 13:15 on 25 September, Sottotenente Cerofolini, Sergente Franco Porta and Sergente Luigi Giannotti of the 82^a Squadriglia, 13^o Gruppo, scrambled from Gambut to intercept returning enemy bombers that had just attacked Tobruk. The three pilots headed out over open sea and climbed to 4000 metres where they 20 minutes after take off spotted six enemy bombers heading east in two vics of three.
The British bombers tried to escape by diving but the Italian fighters caught up with the second vic. The two wingmen were attacked first, the left one was machine gunned and seen to hit the surface of the sea where the crash raised a high water column while the right one was seen to dive at sea level with the left engine on fire. Then it was the turn of the leader, which was heavily damaged and was last seen heading towards land with the aircraft trailing thick clouds of smoke.
The three pilots then continued to pursue the bombers of the first vic but when they were down at 500 metres they were unable to get closer and had to content themselves by emptying their guns from a distance without effect.
They returned to base with damaged fighters at 14:30. Back at base, it was assessed that the first two aircraft of the first 'vic' were to be considered confirmed shot down and the third one probably shot down; all three credited as shared. Cerofolini, Porta and Giannotti had scrambled without lifejackets and followed their opponents 100 kilometres over open sea and back at base they were proposed for an immediate Medaglia d argento al valor militare for bravery. For Porta this was the second time during the same week.
The Italian pilots had run across a wing formation of Bristol Blenheims, which had taken off at around 12:15 to attack Tobruk. It was composed by nine aircraft from 55 Squadron under Flight Lieutenant R. B. Cox that acted as Wing leader, nine aircraft from 113 Squadron led by Squadron Leader Bateson and nine from 211 Squadron led by Squadron Leader Gordon-Finlayson. The attack developed at 14:20 with the Blenheims arriving in subsequent vics. 55 Squadron's bombs fell right across the town to the jetty. Further observation of damage inflicted became soon impossible due to high dust clouds rising. 113 Squadron s crews reported direct hit on a barrack block. 55 Squadron escaped unscathed, landing back at 15:50 while 113 Squadron was intercepted by one flight of CR.42s during the return flight when 20 miles out to sea. An astern chase continued for 10 minutes, resulting in two aircraft being hit and landing at base unserviceable. It appears that also 211 Squadron's aircraft were intercepted since Blenheim Mk.I L8523 of this unit crash-landed with the starboard engine on fire at Qasaba; Squadron Leader J. Gordon-Finlayson DFC, Sergeant Richmond and Sergeant Jones escaped uninjured. The aircraft was destroyed beyond repair. Gordon-Finlayson had just been promoted to command the Squadron, taking the place of Squadron Leader Bax.
The Regia Aeronautica suffered two dead and ten wounded during the attack on Tobruk town.

After the capture of Sidi Barrani on 16 September, the Italian Army formed a defensive line composed of big outposts separated by wide desert areas. From north to south there were the 1^a Divisione Libica (1st Libyan infantry division) at Maktila, near the sea east of Sidi Barrani and the 4^a Divisione Camice Nere (4th Black shirts Division) at Sidi Barrani. South of these were the 2^a Divisione Libica (2nd Libyan infantry division) in three strong points called Alam El Tummar East, Alam El Tummar West and Point 90 (also called Ras El Dai). South of this was the motorised ”Maletti Group” in the entrenched camp of Nibeiwa (strong points: Alam Nibeiwa and Alam El Iktufa). Then there was a gap of around thirty kilometres (called the Bir Enba gap) and at the extreme south of the Italian front the 63^a Divisione di Fanteria (Italian Infantry division) ”Cirene” in four strong points around the rocky hill of Bir Sofafi; Alam El Rabia, the crossroads at height 236, the crossroads at Qabe el Mahdi and Height 226 at Bir Sofafi.
This deployment was clearly lacking, in particular, the worst error seemed the wide gap between ”Maletti” and ”Cirene” a distance that allowed for encirclement of the forces south of Sidi Barrani and north of Bir Sofafi.
On 19 November, General O’Connor ordered a fully motorised support group to enter the gap and stay there as to mark the British supremacy over the important area (in fact he had already planned to use this zone to pass through his troops and attack Nibeiwa). Reconnaissance units of the ”Maletti” Group signalled the dangerous presence of British armoured cars, and a combined action was planned for the day after.
During the early morning, a formation of 17 fighters of the 151^o Gruppo escorted a formation of Bredas attacking enemy troops in the Bir Enba area and a Ro.37bis reconnoitring in the same general area. The mission was uneventful and the 366^a Squadriglia went down after the Bredas to strafe enemy vehicles.
Then an armoured column of the ”Maletti” Group (420 troopers and 27 officers on 37 trucks with a strong of artillery of six anti-tank and six medium calibre guns and 27 M11/39 medium tanks) left Nibeiwa and a column of the 2^a Divisione Libica (256 troopers and 17 officers on 29 trucks with four anti-tank and eight medium calibre guns) left Tummar. They had to rendezvous and then explore the Bir Enba gap. British forces opposing them are not known but Italian Intelligence estimated an armoured group of 60 to 70 tanks and armoured cars (the Italian Intelligence generally overestimated the actual force of the Commonwealth troops by a factor of between two to ten).
At 12:40, the ”Maletti” group was attacked by the British forces and forced to do battle. Around half an hour later at 13:00 the 2^a Libyan’s contingent arrived and together they forced the British forces to retreat. While they were coming back to base, the British returned and attacked again, starting a dangerous rearguard action.
At 13:00, 18 CR.42s from the 13^o Gruppo were ordered off from Gambut G to patrol the Bir Enba area. After take-off, a first group of 12 aircraft led by the newly promoted Tenente Colonnello Secondo Revetria stayed at 3000 meters while a second group of led by Tenente Guglielmo Chiarini covered them 2000 meters higher. Revetria’s formation included pilots from the 77^a (Capitano Domenico Bevilacqua, Tenente Eduardo Sorvillo, Sottotenente Mario Nicoloso, Sergente Enrico Botti, Sergente Vincenzo Campolo and an unrecorded pilot), 78^a (Sottotenente Natale Cima, Sergente Maggiore Salvatore Mechelli, Sergente Cassio Poggi and Sergente Teresio Martinoli) and 82^a (Sottotenente Virgilio Vanzan) Squadriglie.
When they arrived over Bir Enba, Revetria made a first pass to better spot targets and observed an artillery duel between Italian guns and British tanks. Immediately the British vehicles, which were encircling the right flank of the Italian troops, stopped to fire and dispersed. Revetria and his eleven pilots attacked in single file causing a lot of damage among the enemies. After the strafing attack, the twelve 13^o Gruppo pilots returned undamaged to base where they landed 14:50 after having spent 2200 rounds of 12,7 and 7,7 calibre ammunitions.
In the meantime, Chiarini’s formation was down to 4000 meters when they spotted a formation of a reported eight Gladiators that looked as they were trying to attack Revetria’s formation. Chiarini immediately attacked with height advantage and surprised the Gladiator. The first pass only managed to break the Gladiator formation without causing losses and then a long dogfight started (Chiarini recorded that it lasted for 25 minutes) after which six British Gladiators were claimed shot down in flames, all shared by the six pilots of the Italian formation; Tenente Chiarini, Sottotenente Cerofolini, Sottotenente Giuseppe Bottà, Sottotenente Giuseppe Timolina, Sergente Nino Campanini and Sergente Francesco Nanin. A seventh Gladiator was claimed as seriously damaged and was last seen flying low towards Matruh smoking and without taking evasive actions being claimed as a shared probable and the last Gladiator was also claimed as a shared probable. It was reported that all the victories were confirmed by the Libyan land forces (Chiarini also reported that the wreck of one of the Gladiators was noted on the ground by his pilots). The six Italian fighters came back almost without fuel left, they had used 1595 rounds 12,7 calibre and 2330 round 7,7 calibre ammunitions. Only four of them were slightly damaged. The heaviest damage was suffered by Timolina’s aircraft, which landed at an advanced airbase (probably Sollum) and was flown back to base the day after. His aircraft was still not operational at the beginning of Operation ”Compass” much more because of the inadequacy of the Italian repair organisation than because of the damage actually suffered.
It seems that the ”eight Gladiators” were in fact a formation of four Gladiators from 3 RAAF Squadron. Flight Lieutenant Blake Pelly (N5753), had been ordered to undertake a reconnaissance over enemy positions in the Sofafi-Rabia-Bir Enba areas. Squadron Leader Peter Ronald Heath (N5750), and Flying Officers Alan Rawlinson (L9044) and Alan Boyd (N5752) provided his escort. The aircraft took off from Gerawla at 13:40. Flying at about 1,700 meters and with Pelly some 180 meters in front the escort, they headed for their objective. After about half an hour and about eleven kilometres east of Rabia, 18 CR.42s were spotted below strafing British troops. In accordance with orders, the reconnaissance flight turned around and headed for home. They had barely turned around when they were attacked by the CR.42s. Pelly out in the lead found himself at the centre of attention from nine Fiats. His escort were likewise engaged with a similar number.
Boyd found himself being attacked from astern by three aircraft. By twisting and diving he found himself behind one of them and fired off a long burst into the cockpit area. The Fiat rolled over and dived towards the ground. Pulling up into a tight turn he was able to bring his sights to bear on another enemy fighter. Coming in for a quarter attack, the Fiat fell into an uncontrollable spin with thick black smoke pouring from the engine. With barely a pause Boyd pulled round and went after a third fighter, which was attacking one of the Gladiators. After hitting it with a short burst it fell away. As he was watching it fall away, he was attacked from behind by yet another Fiat. Hauling hard back on the stick, he went straight up, with the engine on full power. This caused the enemy fighter to overshoot him. Rolling over, Boyd came down and fired directly into the engine and cockpit area, the Fiat then spun down towards the ground. Looking round, he saw another fighter and set off in pursuit. The Italian saw him and pulled up into a climb, Boyd followed but his engine stalled and he entered a spin, only pulling out when he was within 30 feet of the ground. As he pulled out, he was attacked by yet another Fiat. To complicate matters further Boyd’s guns had jammed, and he struggled with the mechanisms trying desperately to free them, all the while being pursued a few meters off the ground by an enemy fighter. At last, he freed up the two fuselage guns and in a desperate measure he yanked back the stick and went up into a loop. Coming over the top, he saw the Fiat below him and at a range of less than 30 meters he let fly with his remaining guns. The cockpit of the Fiat erupted with bullet strikes and it fell away to the desert floor.
With no more enemy aircraft in the vicinity, Boyd took stock of his situation. He had very little ammo left and only two working guns. In the distance, he saw one aircraft being pursued by two more. Turning in their direction he gained some altitude and closed in. He soon recognised Pelly’s Gladiator coming under attack from two Fiats. He immediately attacked one which was firing on Pelly, who was about to land with a faltering engine, this aircraft rolled over and dived towards the ground which was only 10 meters away. It seems unlikely that it could have pulled out. Pelly’s engine had picked up again and he started to climb away from the area. The remaining Fiat turned on Boyd, whose guns had jammed again and chased him at low level for about a mile before giving up and turning away. Boyd rejoined Pelly and both pilots made their way home. Along the way Pelly had to land at Minqar Qaim at 14:45 when his engine gave out. It was discovered that his oil tank had been hit and all the oil had drained out (the aircraft was flown back to Gerawla the next day). Boyd continued on his own back to base where he landed at 14:50.
During this combat was 26-year-old Squadron Leader Heath (RAAF no. 87) shot down in flames and killed. He was later buried beside his aircraft.
Boyd was credited with three CR.42s shot down and one probable, Pelly claimed one shot down and one damaged, while Rawlinson claimed a damaged.
Flying Officer Boyd reported:

”I was one of a formation of three Gladiators escorting another Gladiator doing a Tac. R. At approximately 1400 I sighted 6 to 9 CR.42’s flying about 200 ft. [60 meters] in a North Westerly direction. We immediately turned east and had gone about a mile when about 6 CR.42’s attacked from above and behind and slightly on my starboard side.
We broke formation and attacked individually. A dog fight ensued, the enemy not remaining in formation after the initial attack. I made several attacks four of which were on separate aircraft and at a very close range varying from 20 to 50 yards [18-46 meters]. The first was a close quarter attack, the tracers could be seen hitting the area of the pilots cockpit and towards the engine. The CR.42 the[n] fell away into a spin apparently out of control and was last seen at about 200 feet [60 meters] still spinning.
The last three close attacks on three separate aircraft were delivered as a stern attack with the enemy climbing steeply so that I could see almost straight into their cockpits.
Each spun away after I had fired bursts which I could see hitting the enemy aircraft. No. 1 of the three really had no room to pull out of the spin, No. 2 I did not see crash but he seemed to be in an uncontrolled spin 200 feet [60 meters] from the ground.
I then saw two CR.42’s on the tail of a Gladiator, so I went to his aid, gained height, directed a point blank attack on one CR.42’s tail. I fired a long burst into him at a range of about 20 yards [18 meters] and he flicked over and disappeared under me only 100 feet [30 meters] from the ground. I did not see him hit because of the second CR.42 which was attacking me, and as my ammunition had run out, I was relieved to see him make off. As I looked around the only aircraft I could see were this one and F.Lt. Pelly’s. The time was then about 1430 hours.
My height at the commencement of the battle was about 5000 feet [1,500 meters] and after the first few minutes the battle continued under 1500 feet [460 meters].
In the early stages of the battle I was firing at long range but after the first five to seven minutes I only fired when at very close range.”

”It was first observed that 9 to 12 C.R.42’s were diving below us from the SOUTH to NORTH. Our formation was flying WEST. We then turned EAST and the above formation was out of sight to the NORTH.
About one to two miles [1.6-3.2 kilometres] after turning, three aircraft were observed coming up from below and firing. Our formation and the reconnaissance Gladiator commenced individual attacking. Three more C.R.42’s were observed to join in.
In the fight about five attacks were made by me on C.R.42’s, they broke off by turning and diving.
One C.R.42 was attacked head on and shots from a good burst appeared to hit the aircraft. He turned overhead and dived, but could not be followed up due to further attacks.
One Gladiator was observed diving away from the fight with a C.R.42 behind. I was above, and dived on the C.R.42. About two bursts were fired at it when it dived and broke away. I followed the Gladiator, who started a right hand turn and hit the ground while diving and burst into flames. The fight was then about three to four miles [4.8-6.4 kilometres] to the NORTH WEST. I turned SOUTH WEST and climbed, and was heading WEST; about four aircraft were observed fighting low down. I then lost sight of them, waited near the area, but could not observe any aircraft, and came home.
Time of Gladiator crash was 1417 hours.”

”While proceeding on reconnaissance to SOFAFI area in company with an escort of 3 other Gladiators, I encountered two formations of C.R.42 aircraft, consisting of EIGHT and NINE respectively.
The formation of EIGHT attacked my escort and the other formation cut me off and drove me southwards. The interception occurred at 1400 when I was 7 miles [11 kilometres] EAST of RABIA, and my escort were two miles [3.2 kilometres] N.E of me. I was at 4,000 feet [1,200 meters] and my escort at 5,000 feet [1,500 meters].
I could not get back to my escort, and the repeated attacks of the NINE C.R.42s forced me Southwards, and I worked Eastwards.
Shortly after the commencement of the battle I found myself meeting one E.A. head on at 50 feet [15 meters]. We both opened fire and he dived under me and crashed into the ground.
About 5 E.A. must have broken off, but at least 3 pursued me and attacked determinedly until 1425 when I worked Northwards and rejoined on of my escort (F/O A.H. Boyd). These three then broke off.
During the battle at approximately 1405 I turned at two E.A. who were attacking me from rear and got in one good burst. This aircraft issued black smoke, which increased in intensity until he finally broke away. I saw him flying away in a cloud of black smoke.”

At 10:15 on 12 December, five CR.42s of the 82^a Squadriglia (Capitano Guglielmo Arrabito, Sottotenente Cerofolini, Sottotenente Giuseppe Timolina, Sergente Maggiore Dante Davico and Sergente Luigi Giannotti) took off from Gambut to escort a formation of seven SM 79s from the 9^o Stormo led by Colonnello Mario Aramu, which were to attack enemy troops near Halfaya.
Capitano Arrabito formed his fighters on the left of the bombers and 2000 metres higher. When over Bu Giallach he discovered an enemy monoplane that looked as if was moving into position for an attack on the SM 79s and he immediately dived on it. He damaged it, forcing it to flee (possibly Flight Sergeant Morris from 274 Squadron). Then he identified a Bristol Blenheim that was ground strafing the already empty landing ground of A3 and claimed it shot down (individually) in flames. This was probably Blenheim Mk.I L8465 of 45 Squadron that was shot-down during a raid on Sollum, killing the crew; Pilot Officer Patrick Cullimore Traill-Smith (RAF no. 42451), Pilot Officer Vincent Dennis Fry (RAF no. 43055) and Sergeant Tom Osborn Liggins (RAF no. 630475).
After the attack, Arrabito tried to turn back to his escort duty but the engine of his CR.42 failed and he had to force-land among Italian troops near Mu Said. He was driven back to Tobruk in a car and during the return journey had to witness many nuisance attacks by the Hurricanes ground strafing the road.
Giannotti suffered almost the same fate after succeeding in landing at Amseat after engine troubles (his fighter was most probably lost here). Timolina and Davico discovered that their engines too were not working properly and immediately turn back to Gambut leaving the lone Cerofolini to escort the SM 79s. Cerofolini went with the Savoias as far as Buq-Buq. While doing this he was attacked twice by British monoplanes but each time he was able to evade and returned safely to T2.
The bombers returned to Gambut at 10:40 without losses.
274 Squadron reported that from 06:15 to 09:45, 15 Hurricanes took off individually. After refuelling at LG 70, they attacked transports and troops west of Sollum. The purpose of this operation was to turn the Italian retreat into a route and to demoralise the enemy communication during the retreat.
All aircraft were back safely except for Flight Sergeant Morris that force-landed Hurricane Mk.I P3723 30 miles west of Mersa Matruh. Returning to base the day after, he claimed the destruction of two SM 79s, in a position 2-3 miles SSE of Capuzzo and reported:

"At 9.30 hours 12.12.40 I took off from Sidi Heneish to carry out ground strafing WEST of SOLLUM. I landed at an advanced Landing Ground, refuelled and proceeded to target area. I passed just SOUTH of FORT CAPUZZO at 11,000 feet and selected vehicles on the CAPUZZO - BARDIA ROAD as my objective. When at 8,000 feet I saw below at 4,000 feet , and at 5 o clock, 6 aircraft proceeding S.S.E. I dived to investigate and when behind at 2,000 feet above them I identified them as 3 SM 79s in close vic escorted by 3 CR 42s. The escort being 500 feet above and just to the left of the S79s. I selected the right hand SM 79 (No.2) as my first target. I closed to within 150 yards astern and slightly above it. I gave it a burst of about 50 rounds and it immediately did an half roll to the right and went down almost vertically. I watched it almost down to ground level which was obscured by dust. It did not drop its bombs on being attacked so that it must have been completely surprised. As the CR 42s still maintained their position I closed to about 100 yards behind and slightly above the leader (No.1). I gave this one a burst of 50 rounds and this also went down to the right in a terrific side-slip still maintaining its original course. I watched this one descend until it was close to the ground and then the remaining bomber did a medium turn to the left right underneath the fighter escort and did a shallow dive towards FORT CAPUZZO which was on the reciprocal course. I did not follow this bomber due to the reception I should receive from the Fort. I was now at 1,000 feet and turned back and saw the three C.R. 42s circling at about 5,000 feet above the scene of the original action. Apparently they were searching for the bombers, the split up of which must have been entirely unobserved by them. I then decided to attack them also, so I climbed in a large circle around them in order to get into the sun. When in position at 5,500 feet I dived on them hoping to cover all three machines by a long burst from the beam or quarter. When I was about 1000 yards from them my approach must have been observed as they made off at full speed to the west diving fairly steeply. As my advantage of surprise was lost and I could not follow them very far, I decide to carry on with my original intention of ground strafing. I was still in the vicinity of FORT CAPUZZO and again located my target. This time on my way down I see a landing ground about three miles NORTH of the Fort on the west side of the road. I circled the landing ground and reduced height to about 1000 feet and saw 10 aircraft dispersed on and around it, of these at least one was a Breda 65, others were CR 42s. Full identification was impossible owing to the dust storm in the vicinity. I attacked and in two dives covered two of the CR 42s with my fire; when breaking away I looked down into some slit trenches but could not see no personnel. As now I had just enough petrol to return to base I climbed out of the dust and when at about 1,300 feet I observed three CR 42s patrolling about 2,000 feet above me slightly to the EAST. My approach was observed and I had to turn NORTH towards BARDIA in order to avoid combat being at great disadvantage. The CR 42s remained to the EAST of me and flew on a parallel course still maintaining their advantage of height.
Just SOUTH of BARDIA I turned EAST went down to 50 feet into the dust and eluded my pursers. Owing to this last action I did not have enough petrol to return to base, so endeavoured to find L.G. 74. This landing ground was totally obscured by dust so I continued on my course to Base. Thirty miles WEST of MATRUH my fuel supply was very low so I forced landed successfully. Petrol was sent to me and I returned to base the following day, 13.12.40. At no time during the whole of this trip did I experience enemy fire."

Cerofolini ended the war with 8 shared biplane victories.

Claims:

Kill no.	Date	Time	Number	Type	Result	Plane type	Serial no.	Locality	Unit
	1940
	25/09/40	13:15-14:30	1/3	Blenheim (a)	Shared destroyed	Fiat CR.42		Off Tobruk	82a Squadriglia
	25/09/40	13:15-14:30	1/3	Blenheim (a)	Shared destroyed	Fiat CR.42		Off Tobruk	82a Squadriglia
	25/09/40	13:15-14:30	1/3	Blenheim (a)	Shared probable	Fiat CR.42		Off Tobruk	82a Squadriglia
	19/11/40		1/6	Gladiator (b)	Shared destroyed	Fiat CR.42		Bir Emba - Bir Mella	82a Squadriglia
	19/11/40		1/6	Gladiator (b)	Shared destroyed	Fiat CR.42		Bir Emba - Bir Mella	82a Squadriglia
	19/11/40		1/6	Gladiator (b)	Shared destroyed	Fiat CR.42		Bir Emba - Bir Mella	82a Squadriglia
	19/11/40		1/6	Gladiator (b)	Shared destroyed	Fiat CR.42		Bir Emba - Bir Mella	82a Squadriglia
	19/11/40		1/6	Gladiator (b)	Shared destroyed	Fiat CR.42		Bir Emba - Bir Mella	82a Squadriglia
	19/11/40		1/6	Gladiator (b)	Shared destroyed	Fiat CR.42		Bir Emba - Bir Mella	82a Squadriglia

Biplane victories: 8 shared destroyed, 1 shared probably destroyed.
TOTAL: 8 shared destroyed, 1 shared probably destroyed.
(a) Claimed in combat with Blenheims from 55, 113 and 211 Squadrons, which suffered one crash-landed (Blenheim L8523 from 211 Sq.) and two damaged bombers (from 113 Sq.).
(b) Claimed in combat with 3 RAAF Squadron, which claimed four CR.42s, one probable and two damaged while losing one Gladiator and getting one damaged. The 82^a Squadriglia claimed six shared Gladiators and one damaged while suffering four lightly damaged fighters.

Sources:
2^o Stormo - Note storiche dal 1925 al 1975 - Gino Strada, 1975 USSMA, Rome, kindly provided by Stefano Lazzaro
2^o Stormo - Note storiche dal 1925 al 1975 - Gino Strada, 1975 USSMA, Rome, kindly provided by Stefano Lazzaro
Desert Prelude: Early clashes June-November 1940 - Håkan Gustavsson and Ludovico Slongo, 2010 MMP books, ISBN 978-83-89450-52-4
Desert Prelude: Operation Compass - Håkan Gustavsson and Ludovico Slongo, 2011 MMP books, ISBN 978-83-61421-18-4
Diario Storico 77^a Squadriglia kindly provided by Ludovico Slongo
Diario Storico 78^a Squadriglia kindly provided by Ludovico Slongo
Diario Storico 82^a Squadriglia kindly provided by Ludovico Slongo
Elenco Nominativo dei Militari dell’ A. M. Decorati al V. M. Durante it Periodo 1929 - 1945 1 Volume A - L
Fiat CR.42 Aces of World War 2 - Håkan Gustavsson and Ludovico Slongo, 2009 Osprey Publishing, Oxford, ISBN 978-1-84603-427-5
Fighters over the Desert - Christopher Shores and Hans Ring, 1969 Neville Spearman Limited, London
L aeronautica Italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale I volume - Giuseppe Santoro, 1966 Second Edition, Editore Esse, Milano-Roma, kindly provided by Ludovico Slongo.

The Bristol Blenheim: A complete history Graham Warner, 2002 Cr cy Publishing Limited, Manchester, ISBN 0-947554-92-0
Additional information kindly provided by Stefano Lazzaro and Ludovico Slongo.